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ABSTRACT 
An organized and thorough systems design framework is necessary to 
successfully address large-scale, complex problems, such as the utilization of unmanned 
sensor technologies to provide situational awareness (SA) in the counter-improvised 
explosive device (C-IED) fight.  An appropriate systems engineering design process was 
used to develop such a framework, as the completion of the first two phases—problem 
definition and solution design—provides a basis for analysis of alternatives and a design 
recommendation.  This process generated the following problem statement:  Design a 
system that, through the use of unmanned sensors, provides effective and efficient SA to 
the commander in a C-IED scenario.  By effective, the system must maximize the ability 
to process sensor imagery and detect, classify, identify, and counter IEDs. To be efficient, 
the system must address important characteristics of operational suitability and 
survivability.  Thus, providing SA, maximizing operational suitability, and maximizing 
Soldier survivability are the primary objectives in the effective and efficient employment 
of unmanned sensors in C-IED.  Three physical alternatives were generated and 
synthesized:  baseline, near-term, and long-term.  Each alternative consisted of a 
combination of sensors, satellites, and unmanned systems to ensure that the top-level SA 
functions are addressed.  Each alternative’s basic specifications, battlefield flow 
(highlighting each unmanned sensor’s use for observe, process information, and 
understanding the environment), and drawbacks are addressed. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An organized and thorough systems design framework is necessary in order to 
successfully address large-scale, complex problems, such as the utilization of unmanned 
sensor technologies to provide situational awareness (SA) in the counter-improvised 
explosive device (C-IED) fight.  An appropriate systems engineering design process was 
used to develop such a framework. 
This research begins by exploring the background and motivation of the use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unmanned sensor technology, and SA through 
literature review and input from appropriate stakeholders.  Then, the current satellite, 
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and camera 
systems used in theater are described, along with their basic physical and performance 
capabilities.  Future systems are described for consideration in the generation of 
alternatives.  A common operational scenario faced in the C-IED environment concerns 
distinguishing IEDs from debris alongside roadways within a unit’s area of operations, 
and this serves as the overall context for the development of this framework. 
A systems engineering design process begins with the problem definition phase, 
which begins with stakeholder analysis, and culminates with the development of a 
functional and objectives hierarchy for providing SA.  The revised problem statement, 
which serves as the top-level objective, is as follows: 
Design a system that, through the use of unmanned sensors, provides 
effective and efficient SA to the commander in a C-IED scenario.  By 
effective, the system must maximize the ability to process sensor imagery 
and detect, classify, identify, and counter IEDs.  To be efficient, the 
system must address important characteristics of operational suitability 
and survivability. 
Thus, providing SA, maximizing operational suitability, and maximizing Soldier 
survivability are the top-level objectives in the effective and efficient employment of 
unmanned sensors in C-IED.  Quantitative measures, defined as measures of performance 
(MOPs), are proposed for each of these qualitative functions.  The objectives hierarchy, 
shown in Figure 1, shows the relationship of the three top-level objectives and their sub-
 xx
objectives, and serves as the foundation for assessing the selected alternatives.  A 
description of these objectives and their associated metrics is below. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Objectives hierarchy 
 
 The objective observe is achieved via human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal 
intelligence (SIGINT).  Squads on patrol, Soldier interaction with the local populace, 
interrogation of detainees, and informants are all forms of HUMINT.  While HUMINT is 
an important component of observation on the battlefield, this research focused solely on 
the utilization of SIGINT.  Manned and unmanned sensors are the key components of 
SIGINT and provide a commander with either still imagery or streaming video of 
designated target or observation areas.  Sensors have varying payloads, resolution 
capabilities, bandwidth restrictions, and available spectrums in which to perform 
surveillance operations.  Larger payloads on sensor systems mean more capability to 
carry a variety of equipment.  The MOPs for the observe function are quality of imagery, 
surveillance coverage, and sensor payload capacity. 
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 The data received from unmanned systems must be processed in order to provide 
commanders with useful information.  Information consists of two critical attributes:  
value and quality (Perry, 2000).  Information has value if “it informs the commander and 
thereby adds to his knowledge of the combat situation” (Perry, 2000, p. 3).  Information 
has value in providing SA if it answers or assists in answering commander’s critical 
information requirements (CCIR).  Information quality consists of three components:  
accuracy, timeliness, and completeness (Perry, 2000).  Therefore, when providing SA in 
combat operations, it is imperative to utilize functions that contribute to providing a 
commander with both valuable and quality information. 
 Accurate and complete information in combat operations is enhanced by 
unmanned sensors when data fusion occurs to combine all available information (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008).  
Data fusion is the process of putting together information obtained from many 
heterogeneous sensors, on many platforms, into a single composite picture of the 
environment.  Emerging technology allows for imagery and videos to be fused using 
meta-data tagging, which are tags describing the data to enable discovery, and include 
time, location, classification, and sensor calibration.  Tags allow data gathered from 
separate sensors to be combined in a meaningful way. 
 Accurate and complete information is of no use to the commander if it arrives too 
late.  The speed in which information is transmitted, processed, and analyzed greatly 
impacts a commander’s ability to act effectively and decisively on the battlefield.  The 
MOPs for the process function are to increase the number of sensors with meta-data 
tagging capability and decrease processing time. 
 Commanders need useful and valuable information in order to understand their 
environment, which includes detecting IEDs, enemy activity, friendly forces, local 
activity, as well as recognizing disturbed soil or tracking an insurgent’s activity patterns. 
Unmanned sensors can be used to identify and classify potential IEDs or investigate 
disturbed soil to negate risk to personnel.  Sensor systems that provide real-time imagery 
for all units operating within an area of operations greatly enhances shared common 
operational picture (COP).  The MOPs for understanding the environment are probability 
 xxii
of detection, probability of false detection, probability of identification, probability of 
false identification, and number of units with real-time imagery. 
Operational suitability is not intended as a physical attribute of the system, or 
what the system does, but instead measures the characteristics of the system.  Operational 
suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in field use with 
respect to reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM), supportability, human 
systems integration (HSI), and interoperability.  This research focuses on the impact of 
reliability and maintainability in the emplacement of unmanned sensor systems in the  
C-IED fight.  These two components were selected because they are important 
considerations from both the system and individual Soldier perspective.  Equipment 
utilized in combat must be able to perform at a high performance level for a sustained 
period of time.  When new or updated systems are introduced without sufficient 
operational testing or with an expedited time line, military maintenance capabilities are 
limited.  The MOPs for operational suitability are system reliability, percentage of unit 
maintenance personnel trained to repair equipment, and percentage of repair parts 
available in unit level logistics system. 
In general, Soldier survivability consists of six key components:  reduce 
fratricide, reduce detectability of the Soldier, reduce probability of being attacked, 
minimize damage, minimize injury, and reduce physical and mental fatigue (Payan & 
Zigler, 2008).  It terms of providing SA in the C-IED fight utilizing unmanned sensors, 
the key component of maximizing Soldier survivability is reducing physical and mental 
fatigue on the Soldier.  Reducing physical and mental fatigue is measured by the 
physical, cognitive, and workload constraints placed on the Soldier by the system (Payan 
& Zigler, 2008), so that the MOPs for reducing Soldier fatigue are training time and 
physical workload. 
 The second phase of the systems engineering process is solution design, and 
consists of generation of alternatives and solution analysis.  To ensure that all the 
significant system functions are adequately addressed in the generation of alternatives, as 
described in the functional hierarchy and reviewed in the objectives hierarchy, the system 
design elements are broken down into partitions or sectors.  Three alternative designs are 
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generated:  baseline, near-term, and long-term.  The baseline system consists of current 
unmanned sensors, and satellites used by the Army; the near-term system includes 
systems that have completed research development tests and are being prepared for 
fielding, and the long-term system combines satellite systems and unmanned sensor 
systems that may be available in the next 10-15 years.  Each alternatives’ basic 
specifications, battlefield flow (highlighting each unmanned sensor’s use for observe, 
detect, and battle management), and drawbacks are addressed.  As an example, 
Alternative 1, the baseline system, is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Alternative 1:  Baseline 
 
The systems engineering framework developed for this research is only a starting 
point for improvements in meeting the war-fighters’ desires to provide SA in the C-IED 
fight.  Although the methodology used in this research provides a framework for pairing 
war-fighter desires with current and future unmanned sensor systems, further alternatives 
 xxiv
may be generated for use in decision making and solution implementation.  
Recommendations for future research in the area of improving SA in the C-IED fight 
through unmanned sensors include performance, cost, and risk analysis.  These analyses 
could evaluate the performance and effectiveness of system alternatives in providing SA 
in the C-IED fight, based on the needs analysis, objectives hierarchy, and associated 
evaluation metrics developed in this thesis.  The three alternatives could be evaluated and 
analyzed with reference to various operational scenarios. 
 xxv
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A. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
This research focuses on considerations for increasing situational awareness (SA) 
in defeating the enemy (determining an attack is in progress, and stopping the attack 
during the execution phase or prior to completion) in the counter-IED (C-IED) fight, 
using unmanned sensor technologies.  The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) defines C-IED as the collection of efforts and operations, 
including offensive and defensive measures, taken to prevent insurgency cells from 
proliferating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), detect or neutralize IEDs once they 
are emplaced, mitigate the effects of an IED event, or train our forces to execute C-IED 
measures.  It also includes intelligence operations to defeat the IED network, as well as 
respond to the IED threat and its effects.  This research develops a framework that 
includes a focused set of system functions and requirements within the context of a 
limited operational concept, as well as alternative solutions that integrate several 
technological systems.  Follow-on research based on this effort should include a systems 
analysis of alternatives through appropriate modeling and simulation, cost and risk 
analysis of each alternative, and an implementation plan. 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
1. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
 The Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism Manual defines 
an IED as: 
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating 
destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and 
designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract.  It may incorporate 
military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. 
(Department of Defense, 1998, p. GL-3) 
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IEDs are not a new guerilla tactic, with instances dating as far back as the Belarussian 
Rail War, when Belarussian guerrillas utilized both command-detonated and delayed-fuse 
IEDs to derail thousands of German trains from 1943-44 (Belarus.by, 2009).  IEDs are 
not a standard military weapon and have a human involved in the loop who decides when 
to arm the device or when to trigger it.  They have been used by various ethnic, cultural, 
and religious groups, but historically were rarely used as a primary means of inflicting 
mass casualties.  However, quickly emerging technologies have allowed today’s 
insurgents to stay one step ahead of American forces’ tactics and capabilities.  IEDs have 
been responsible for the deaths of over 1,800 United States servicemen and women in 
Iraq, and the numbers are quickly rising in Afghanistan (Icasualties.org, 2008). 
 While the number of IED incidents in Iraq decreased by 79%, from its peak of 
2,600 per month in March and June of 2007 to 555 in August 2008, incidents in 
Afghanistan, as seen in Figure 3, are on the rise. 
 
 
Figure 3.   IED incidents in Afghanistan (From:  Afghan Conflict Monitor, 2008) 
 
The emergence of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and the deep-buried or 
underbelly bomb account for a disproportional 70% of U.S. bombing deaths in Iraq 
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(Atkinson, 2007).  Unlike traditional IEDs, which produce a fragmentation or blast to do 
damage, EFPs are directional weapons that form a projectile that follows a linear path 
from a canister.  This new type of IED will not be the last development by insurgents to 
negate our C-IED tactics and technology. 
It is important to note that there is a difference between an IED event and an IED 
campaign.  A few individual IED events, such as pipe bombs or car bombs on U.S. soil, 
are very different from an IED campaign in which an enemy organization is established 
to emplace many IEDs over an extended period of time.  In individual IED events, 
security and police can be used to try to identify the people responsible for the attack.  In 
an IED campaign, there is an organized system or network that will continue to attack 
and allows for a number of different ways to approach the problem.  An IED campaign is 
a part of insurgency warfare and will be continued only as long as it is successful and it 
advances the strategy of the insurgency.  Stopping an IED campaign may not stop the 
insurgency, and even if the attacks are successful, the campaign may be stopped if it is 
not successful in furthering the goals of the insurgency.  A military effort to counter IEDs 
could be successful in the narrow sense of reducing the impact of IEDs and still be 
counterproductive in countering the insurgency. 
2. Unmanned Sensors 
Unmanned systems have traditionally been used to assist commanders in the 
development of a common operational picture (COP).  The Objective Force COP is the 
single set of meaningful information desired by military commanders to expedite the 
decision-action cycle (Waltz & Llinas, 1990).  Unmanned sensors are ideal for assisting 
in the development of a COP in the military’s dull, dirty, or dangerous missions.  Dull 
missions are often defined as long-duration sorties, and using unmanned aircraft systems 
(UASs) for reconnaissance frees up aviation crews for other missions.  Dirty missions 
include flying UASs through nuclear clouds or operating an unmanned ground vehicle 
(UGV) in a contaminated environment.  Use of unmanned systems in dirty missions 
allows for longer observation periods and minimizes human exposure.  Dangerous 
missions include explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) missions and the use of ground 
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robotics to detect or disarm IEDs.  The use of ground robotics has resulted in the 
neutralization of over 11,100 IEDs since 2003 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007). 
Congress has outlined two specific goals for the development of UASs and 
UGVs:  “By 2010, one third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force should be 
unmanned and by 2015, one third of the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) 
operational ground combat vehicles should be unmanned” (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2007, p. 6).  In order to fill these requirements, a proper architecture in which to 
examine possible solution sets must be developed. 
One of the primary issues is how these assets are being used in theater versus 
what they were designed to do.  While unmanned sensors can be used to attack the IED 
network, many units in Iraq are using UASs primarily for finding IEDs that are already 
emplaced (Hodge, 2006).  Interestingly, this is in direct conflict with both  
General Ronald Keys’ and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno’s vision for the use of 
UASs.  General Keys, the Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
stated that “looking for IEDs in Iraq in that fashion is not the best way to stop attacks” 
(Lowe, 2007).  LTG Odierno, currently the Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, 
stated that units should “use UAVs to trace enemy firing teams back to caches and 
assembly areas” and that “units that adopt a proactive, creative approach that 
synchronizes all available reconnaissance and surveillance systems will degrade IED 
networks in their area” (Odierno, 2007, p. 3). 
There has been a significant amount of research conducted on IED 
countermeasures.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has published 
numerous For Official Use Only (FOUO) and classified documents covering current 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in theater and C-IED technologies.  
Using UASs primarily as a means of detecting IEDs, however, was found to be 
ineffective in a classified thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School (Brock &  
Gammache, 2007). 
Another emerging area of research in the C-IED arena is the idea of defeating the 
network via social network analysis.  The use of human intelligence and social  
 
 5
interactions is gaining momentum and is becoming a large area of C-IED focus.  
However, due to time constraints, this research focuses solely on unmanned  
sensor technologies. 
3. Situational Awareness (SA) 
The Army defines SA as: 
Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes 
timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, competitive and other 
operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decision making.  
An informational perspective and skill that fosters an ability to determine 
quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004, p. 171) 
A simpler definition of SA is “knowing what is going on around you” (Endsley & 
Garland, 2000, p. 5).  In combat situations, this includes reconnaissance, precision target 
identification, and designation and battle management.  The development of an 
operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 
that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.  This 
environment includes physical areas and factors of land, air, sea, and space as well as the 
cyber domain of information (Department of Defense, 2006).  The U.S. joint community 
uses a systems perspective on the political, military, economic, social, information, and 
infrastructure (PMESII) elements of an operational environment.  This operational 
environment is complex, with additional immeasurable elements such as the culture, 
perceptions, beliefs, and values of the actors operating within the environment.  SA is the 
intangible measure in the center of analysis, rather than a discrete assessment of a 
specific issue or action.  A detailed discussion of SA, and how it is specifically related to 
defeating IEDs, is found in Chapter III. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Primary Research Question:  What material solutions may be utilized in 
conjunction with unmanned sensors to increase SA in the C-IED fight? 
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 Subsidiary Research Question:  What are the system functions that address SA 
in the defeat of IEDs? 
 Subsidiary Research Question:  What metrics best represent the attainment of 
important functions and objectives regarding SA in the C-IED fight? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
While there is a general consensus that the utilization of a systems design process 
allows for an organized approach to generate and evaluate various alternatives, there is 
not a commonly accepted definition of systems engineering.  The International Council 
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines it as: 
An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful systems.  It focuses on defining customer needs and required 
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, 
then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while 
considering the complete problem. (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008, 
p. 167) 
Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson define systems engineering as: 
The systems engineering thought process is a holistic, logically structured 
sequence of cognitive activities that support system design, systems 
analysis and systems decision making to maximize the value delivered by 
a system to its stakeholders for the resources. (2008, p. 9) 
Finally, according to Blanchard and Fabrycky in Systems Engineering and 
Analysis, systems engineering is “ good engineering with emphasis on using a top down 
approach, definition of system requirements, utilization of a life-cycle orientation and an 
interdisciplinary or team approach” (2006, p. 18). 
There are several published methodologies in which to apply the systems 
engineering process.  Each of these design processes includes an organized and structured 
approach in which to solve a given problem.  This research follows the systems 
engineering process described by Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson and utilized at the 
Systems Engineering Department at the United States Military Academy and is depicted 
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in Figure 4.  There are four major phases that are iterative in nature and assist in 
organizing the problem:  problem definition, solution design, decision making, and 
solution implementation.  This research focuses on the first and second phases.  The first 
phase, problem definition, consists of three key components:  conducting stakeholder 
analysis, performing functional analysis, and constructing a value model.  The second 
phase, solution design, is the generation of ideas, refinement, and the generation and 
screening of alternatives (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Systems decision process (From:  Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008) 
 
This research transforms stakeholder requirements and customer needs into  
top-level functions.  These functions are paired with objectives and measured using value 
measures.  Development of a qualitative model leads to a generation of alternatives that 
will be evaluated using a quantitative value model.  The value model allows for the 
analysis of existing and near-term unmanned sensor technology against the  
stakeholder-approved value measures. 
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II. COUNTER-IED (C-IED) TECHNOLOGY 
A. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) CATEGORIES 
 The three ways of classifying or categorizing IEDs are by trigger type, warhead 
type, or delivery mechanism.  There are three primary trigger types or means of 
detonating an IED:  radio control (RCIED), victim-operated (VOIED), and infrared (IR).  
Joint Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense, 2001) defines two warhead classification 
types:  the IED and the improvised nuclear device (IND).  The differentiating factor is 
that the IND contains radioactive material (Department of Defense, 2001).  The most 
common delivery mechanisms used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are  
car/vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), EFPs, suicide bombers, platter charges, and, more 
recently, improvised rocket assisted munitions (IRAM).  IRAMs are propane tanks filled 
with explosives and powered by 107mm rockets (Londono, 2008). 
An EFP is a special type of shape charge used to penetrate armor effectively at 
stand-off distances.  It has a liner in the shape of a shallow dish, and when the explosive 
detonates, as seen in Figure 5, the EFP liner is generally folded into its final rod-like 
shape for maximum penetration of armor plating. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Formation of an EFP warhead (From:  Londono, 2008) 
 
Sophisticated EFP warheads have multiple detonators that can be fired in different 
arrangements, causing different types of waveforms in the explosion.  This results in a 
long-rod penetrator, an aerodynamic slug projectile, or multiple high-velocity fragments.  
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The EFP uses explosives to form a molten copper penetrator instead of using an 
explosive blast or solid metal penetrator, and are therefore extremely dangerous, even to 
the new generation of Army Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which 
were designed to withstand an antitank mine (Eisler, 2007).  An EFP can penetrate a 
thickness of armored steel equal to half the diameter of its charge for a copper or iron 
liner, and armored steel equal to the diameter of its charge for a tantalum liner 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2008). 
 As our technology improves, the insurgents alter, improve, and make bigger and 
deadlier devices.  Shape charges, VBIEDs, and now EFPs, are just the beginning of the 
enemy’s methods.  There is a real and growing concern that IEDs will become the 
weapon of choice for other terrorists and insurgents worldwide (Wilson, 2007). 
B. CURRENT COUNTER-IED (C-IED) TECHNOLOGIES 
Brigade Combat Teams currently deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan have a mix of unmanned 
systems to utilize in their tactical planning.  Most deploy with a mix of satellites, UASs, 
UGVs, and ground cameras or surveillance systems in order to have persistent 
surveillance and communication capabilities. 
1. Satellites 
Twenty-five hundred years ago the Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote, ‘If 
you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles.’  But how are U.S. soldiers, operating covertly in 
unfamiliar and hostile territory, to know where their allies are, where their 
enemies are, and what each is doing?  How are they to receive commands 
and report status?  The answer is satellite communications. (Martin, 
2001/2002, p. 3) 
 Today’s Army depends heavily on satellites for developing a COP.  Satellites 
provide a means for voice communications, video imagery, and still imagery to be 
projected across the battlefield.  Current Military Satellite Communications Systems 
(MILSATCOMs) include Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), Super-High Frequency (SHF), 
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and Extremely-High Frequency (EHF) capabilities.  UHF is traditionally used by early 
entry Army forces that are highly mobile and may not have access to large ground 
terminals.  Ideally, these early entry forces would utilize communications on the move 
(COTM); however, today’s satellite configurations only provide communications on the 
pause (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003).  SHF systems are a primary choice 
for data transfer for numerous reasons:  They have a low probability of intercept due to 
their usage of narrow beams; they have beyond-line-of-sight high-speed voice, data, and 
imagery flow; and they provide a high-speed rate of transfer (Naval Satellite 
Communications Course [NSCC] Study Guide, 2003).  EHF systems complement both 
the UHF and SHF constellations, but provide greater robustness against jamming and 
scintillation and electromagnetic pulse protection (NSCC Study Guide, 2003). 
Current SHF MILSATCOM systems include the Defense Satellite Constellation 
System (DSCS) and the Wideband Global System (WGS) (or the Global Broadcast 
Service).  The DSCS currently has five primary satellites and six residual satellites 
providing worldwide coverage.  The WGS has 8 times the power of the DSCS and  
11 times the bandwidth.  There will be three WGSs in orbit by the summer of 2009, 
which is the equivalent of 36 DSCSs (Racoosin, 2006). 
EHF was developed to maximize utilization of wide bandwidth and to provide 
protection options that UHF and SHF lack.  Current EHF MILSATCOM systems include 
the Fleet satellite communication (SATCOM) package (FEP), Ultra-high Frequency 
Follow-on Enhanced (UFO/E), the UHF Follow-on EHF Enhanced (UFO/EE), Polar 
EHF Package (PEP), and Milstar.  The Advanced EHF is the successor to the Milstar 
satellite system and will be the Department of Defense’s (DoD) primary system for 
protected satellite communications (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003). 
The demand for bandwidth on the battlefield has resulted in an ever-growing gap 
between capabilities and requirements, as shown in Figure 6, and this demand does not 
seem to be slowing.  Unconstrained demand represents the expectations of operational 
users and the anticipated demand.  The demand generated by sensors and the needs of the 
user has resulted in projected limitations that will be imposed on the capacity of the 
ground terminals and the military SATCOM area coverage and capacity. 
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Figure 6.   Satcom requirements vs. capacity (From:  Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008) 
 
The Pentagon’s recent postponement of the transformational satellite (TSAT) 
contract award until Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 means the satellite package will not be 
available until FY2019, thus greatly limiting the Army’s planned use of the Future 
Combat System and future bandwidth accessibility (Shala-Esa, 2008).  Many of the 
UASs in testing phase were designed to utilize the faster uplinks and data transfer of the 
TSAT constellation.  Customer requirements have not changed, but the proposed satellite 
resources and capabilities available to the warfighter in the near future have.  With the 
Army’s desire for COTM, some of the unmanned sensors currently in development 
phases may need to be re-engineered to utilize the current satellite configurations or 
adjusted to function using less bandwidth. 
2. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) 
To date, Army UAS have flown over 375,000 hours and nearly 130,000 
sorties in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Capabilities of Army UAS have evolved from a theater intelligence asset 
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to primarily tactical roles such as surveillance, reconnaissance, attack, 
targeting, communications relay, convoy overwatch, and cooperative 
target engagement through manned and unmanned (MUM) teaming.  The 
Army is employing UAS as an extension of the tactical commander's eyes 
to find, fix, follow, facilitate, and finish targets.  Army UAS missions are 
integrated into the maneuver commander's mission planning, at the start, 
as a combat multiplier in the contemporary operational environment. 
(Kappenman, 2008, p. 22) 
Unmanned aircraft are designed with four primary modules:  flight control, 
payload control and product dissemination, weapon’s employment, and SA.  For 
purposes of this research, the payload control and product dissemination model are of 
greatest interest.  This includes the electro-optical sensors (still and motion imagery in 
visible, infrared, multispectral, and hyper spectral sensors), synthetic aperture radar, 
signals intelligence sensors, and communications relay equipment (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005). 
The RQ-7 Shadow, shown in Figure 7, is primarily managed at the brigade level.  
It uses an electro-optic/infrared imaging sensor turret and has an endurance capability of  
5 hours.  Each Shadow 200 system includes three unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs, two 
ground stations, and support vehicles for equipment and personnel.  The Shadow’s 
physical and performance characteristics are listed in Table 1 (Goebel, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 7.   RQ-7 Shadow (From:  GlobalSecurity.org, 2005b) 
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RQ-7B Shadow Characteristics 
Length 11.2 ft Wing Span 14 ft 
Gross Weight 375 lbs Payload 60 lbs 
Endurance 7 hrs Ceiling 15,000 ft 
LOS C2 Speed 38 hp Data Links LOS Video Fuel Type MOGAS 
Table 1.   RQ-7B shadow characteristics (From:  Goebel, 2009) 
 
The RQ-11 Raven, as shown in Figure 8, is  managed at the battalion level and is 
often passed down to companies.  The Raven is launched by hand and can fly at an 
altitude of 1,000 ft at speeds up to 52 kts.  It can fly using global positioning system 
(GPS) waypoint navigation or can be navigated from a ground station using a remote 
control.  The Ravens have an analog infrared night vision camera and a color video 
capability (Goebel, 2009).  The Raven’s physical and performance characteristics are 
listed in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 8.   RQ-11 Raven (From:  Simpson, 2005) 
 
Raven Characteristics 
Length 3.4 ft Wing Span 4.3 ft 
Gross Weight 4 lbs Payload 2 lbs 
Endurance 1.5 hrs Ceiling 1,000 ft 
Data Links analog Speed 52 kts 
  Fuel Type Battery 
Table 2.   Raven characteristics (After:  Goebel, 2009) 
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3. Unmanned Ground Systems (UGVs) 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) often have a mix of robotics including the 
multifunction, agile, remote-controlled robot (MARCbot), TALON, and sometimes have 
the field integrated design and operations (FIDO) system upgrades.  MARCbots, as seen 
in Figure 9, are often pushed down to the maneuver company level and divided up among 
platoons.  MARCbots are small, remote-controlled robots that use an attached camera to 
seek out, identify, and confirm possible IEDs. 
 
 
Figure 9.   MARCbot inspecting suspicious package (From:  Clifton, 2005) 
 
The MARCbot has an observation distance of greater than 300 feet and a  
low-light camera with light-emitting diode (LED) arrays for nighttime missions.  The 
camera rises to a vertical height of 3 feet and has the capability to tilt forward for looking 
into potential danger areas.  The MARCbot is powered by standard batteries and is 
valued at less than $10,000 per system (Exponent Engineering and Scientific  
Consulting, 2008). 
The TALON Robot system, as shown in Figure 10, is found with the EOD 
companies that are often attached to the BCTs.  These robots weigh less than 100 pounds, 
are man-portable, and move on small treads with seven speed settings.  The TALON is 
controlled with a joystick, has both audio and video capability, and a mechanical arm 
(Grabianowski, 2005).  The TALON is a rugged robot, with a broad array of sensor 
packages and a quad-screen display.  It can hold up to four color cameras including night 
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vision, thermal, and zoom options.  TALON robots can move as fast as a running Soldier 
and are easy to maintain (Foster-Miller Corporation, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 10.   TALON robot (From:  Grabianowski, 2005) 
 
The FIDO system add-on, as shown in Figure 11, is one of the smallest explosive 
detectors and uses vapor detection comparable to that of bomb dogs. 
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Figure 11.   FIDO (From:  Sacramento L5 Society, 2006) 
FIDO is a handheld system that can be fully or partially integrated with either 
MARCbots or TALON systems.  When fully integrated, the sensor head and its 
communication box are attached to the robot.  The sensor head can be removed and used 
for other handheld operations.  Regardless of the configuration, all detections are 
displayed on the robot’s operator’s control unit (ICX technologies, 2008). 
4. Camera Systems 
BCTs rarely have sole control over large unmanned camera systems; however, 
they often have their own joint land attack cruise missile elevated netted sensor (JLENS).  
A JLENS consists of a surveillance system and a fire control system, and provides  
long-duration, over-the-horizon, and wide-area coverage for battlefield commanders.  
The key component of the system is the sensor, which has a zoom lens, laser range 
finder, and provides infrared coverage at night.  The majority of the systems being used 
in theater are combined with a Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) tower shown 
in Figure 12.  RAID towers are a mix of 30, 60, and 84 quick erect telescope mast towers.  
JLENS has also been paired with a large blimp system (see Figure 13) to provide sensors 
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high above the battlefield.  In both configurations, the JLENS camera sensor is 
networked to a Base Defense Operations Cell, which projects the video feed with 
digitized map overlays (Burlas, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 12.   JLENS and RAID tower  
(From:  United States Army Program Executive Office: Missiles and Space, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 13.   JLENS on blimp (From:  Burlas, 2004) 
 19
The Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) is a force 
protection, camera-oriented, day/night, expeditionary tool that provides the ability to 
detect, track, display, record, assess, deny, and store video to counter the threat of IEDs 
and disrupt insurgency activities (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007); 
see the G-BOSS operational construct as shown in Figure 14.  G-BOSS referred to 
throughout this research is composed of a RAID 107-foot mobile tower with two 
cameras:  a Star SAFIRE IIIFP and a T-3000, a Man-Portable Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition Radar (MSTAR) sensor, and a Ground Control Station (GCS). 
 
  
Figure 14.   G-BOSS components from left to right:  RAID tower, T-3000, Star SAFIRE 
IIIFP, RGS, MSTAR (From:  Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007) 
C. PROPOSED FUTURE COUNTER-IED (C-IED) TECHNOLOGY 
1. Satellites 
As the demand for high-resolution streaming video grows and commanders at all 
levels on the battlefield require real-time information, a bandwidth gap continues to grow 
as well, as discussed in the previous section and seen in Figure 15.  The military’s 
proposed answer to these demands is the Advanced EHF satellite constellation and the 
transformational communications satellite.  Both systems will provide greater protection 
and faster uplink/downlink speeds. 
The advanced extremely-high frequency (AEHF) satellite, shown in Figure 15, is 
the military’s planned next-generation, strategic, protected command and control (C2) 
satellite program and is the successor to Milstar II.  AEHF combines the functionality of 
the Milstar low data rate (LDR) and medium data rate (MDR) payloads into a much 
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smaller integrated EHF communications package.  Compared to Milstar, the AEHF 
system program improvements include higher data rates (8.192 Mbps), an upgraded 
terminal segment, additional nuller antennas, increased throughput, additional uplink and 
downlink channels with interoperable, protected, anti-jamming, low probability of 
intercept and low probability of detection communications (NSCC Study Guide, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 15.   Milstar III (From:  Katzman, 2006) 
 
The TSAT, shown in Figure 16, will consist of a five-satellite constellation, with a 
sixth as a spare, which will provide troops on the ground with orbit-to-ground laser 
communications.  TSAT was designed provide users with a high data rate, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure coverage to replace the DoD’s current satellite system and supplement 
AEHF (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005c).  Imagery from a UAV that would typically take  
2 minutes to process using the Milstar II system or radar imagery from a Global Hawk, 
which traditionally takes about 12 minutes to process, would both take less than a second 
using TSAT (Katzman, 2006).  TSAT will be the first satellite system to provide CMOT 
with a small receiver.  The TSAT system consists of the space segment (satellites), and 
the integrated ground stations and networks (Katzman, 2006).  The TSAT system, shown 
in Figure 16, has been deemed so important to future sensor integration that its immediate 
establishment was listed as one of two primary findings in the October 2008 final report 
of the Defense Science Board and the Intelligence Science Board Joint Task Force on 
Integrating Sensor Collected Intelligence (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008). 
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Figure 16.   TSAT Concept (From:  Katzman, 2006) 
2. Unmanned Air Systems (UASs) 
 Due to the inability to reasonably discuss the remarkably high number of 
unmanned aircraft being tested, developed, and marketed to the United States Military, 
this research will focus on the systems proposed in the Army’s FCS framework (see 
Table 3) and those outlined in the DoD’s UAS Roadmap. 
 
FCS Unmanned Aircraft 
 Platoon Company Battalion Brigade 
Aircraft Raven (interim) TBD Shadow (interim) Fire Scout 
Weight 5-10 lbs 100-150 lbs 300-500 lbs >3,000 lbs 
Endurance 50 mins 2 hrs 6 hrs 24-hr continuous operations 
Radius 8 km 16 km 40 km 75 km 
Transport Manpackable 
(35-lb system) 
2-Soldier Remount 2-Man Lift 100 m x 50 m Recovery Area
Table 3.   The Army’s proposed FCS unmanned aircraft (From:  Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005) 
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The Army’s FCS includes the Raven, Shadow, and Fire Scout for use in the 
various unit levels of a BCT.  The unmanned aircraft for company level use has not  
been projected. 
The Raven is currently undergoing an upgrade from its analog datalink.  A new 
digital data link has undergone two years of testing, with experimentation conducted at 
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.  The updated data link will provide a  
four-time improvement in available channels, increased range, improved video quality, 
relay capability, and encryption (Olean, 2008). 
The DP-5X Wasp, shown in Figure 17, is an FCS-compliant system and has 
successfully completed development and test milestones.  The system is a modular design 
that allows the aircraft to be separated into components and is man-transportable.  It takes 
two operators to launch and can fit into a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 
(HMMWV) system.  Its primary design focus is reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition (RSTA) and can also be used as a communication relay platform.  The DP-5X 
Wasp has a universal payload interface that is field changeable, a secure communication 











DP-5X Wasp Characteristics 
Length 11 ft Rotar Span 10.5 ft Endurance 4.8 hrs 
Gross Weight 475 lbs Payload 75 lbs Speed 110 kts 
Fuel Capacity 165 lbs Fuel Type Heavy Fuel Ceiling 15,000 ft 
Power 97 hp     
Table 4.   Wasp characteristics (After:  DragonFly Pictures, 2009) 
 
The XPV-1 Tern, shown in Figure 18, is a possible FCS system.  The Tern is 
powered by a two-stroke piston engine and has a steerable nose and main gear, with tires 
suitable for rough terrain.  The Tern utilizes a GPS navigation system, and a microwave 
datalink to transmit video imagery and sensor data.  The standard payload includes a 
forward- and side-looking color TV camera with optional battlefield air interdiction 
(BAI) sensor upgrades available (IR, pan tilt, jammers) (Parsch, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 18.   XPV-1 Tern (From:  Parsch, 2005) 
 
XPV-1 Tern Characteristics 
Length 9 ft Wing Span 11.4 ft Endurance 4 hrs 
Gross Weight 130 lbs Payload 25 lbs Speed 68 kts 
Fuel Capacity 28 lbs Fuel Type MOGAS Ceiling 10,000 ft 
LOS C2 Power 12 hp Landing Runway Data Links LOS Video Frequency L/S band, UHF Sensor EO or IR 
Table 5.   Tern characteristics (After:  Parsch, 2005) 
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3. Unmanned Ground Systems 
The Armed Robotic Vehicle-Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 
Acquisition (ARV-RSTA), shown in Figure 19, uses sophisticated on-board sensors to 
detect, recognize, and identify targets.  It is designed to remotely provide reconnaissance 
in urban environments and comes with a direct-fire weapon system.  The ARV-RSTA 
comes with an ANS with GPS with inertial navigation system (INS), perception sensors 
for obstacle detection, and avoidance and autonomous navigation algorithms.  It also has 
a medium-range EO/IR with 16-ft mast, is joint architecture for unmanned systems 
(JAUS) compliant and is compatible with the Multi-functional Utility Logistics 
Equipment (MULE) unmanned system (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 19.   ARV-RSTA (From:  Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007) 
 
The MULE, shown in Figure 20, is an unmanned platform that provides transport 
of equipment and supplies in support of dismounted maneuver.  The 2.5-ton class vehicle 
is a projected part of the FCS and comes in three variants:  transport, armed robotic 




provide additional sensor information in the development of a COP.  The MULE has day 
and night thermal, infrared, and forward-looking imaging systems, which are all JAUS 
compliant (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005a). 
 
 
Figure 20.   MULE (From:  GlobalSecurity.org, 2005a) 
 
The small unmanned ground vehicle (SUGV), shown in Figure 21, is a  
man-packable small robot system that weighs less than 30 lbs.  The SUGV is designed to 
operate in urban operations and can be reconfigured on-site for various mission sets.  It 
will incorporate a lightweight day or night sensor suit capable of providing remote 
surveillance images, is JAUS-compliant, and part of the FCS network (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 21.   SUGV (From:  Roush, 2008) 
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4. Camera Systems 
Each JLENS Orbit, shown in Figure 22, consists of two systems:  a surveillance 
system and fire control system, which includes elevated, long-range surveillance radar 
and elevated, high-performance fire control radar.  Each radar is integrated onto a large 
aerostat, connected by a tether to the ground-based mobile mooring station and 
communications processing group (Staff Writers, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 22.   JLENS updated system (From:  Staff Writers, 2008) 
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION PHASE 
A. OVERVIEW 
As discussed in Chapter I, the systems decision process used in this research 
consists of four major phases that are iterative in nature and assist in organizing the 
problem:  problem definition, solution design, decision making, and solution 
implementation.  The first phase, problem definition, consists of three key components:  
conducting stakeholder analysis, performing functional analysis, and constructing a value 
model.  The problem definition phase does not focus on solutions and is an iterative in 
nature.  At the end of this phase, a clearly defined problem statement emerges that meets 
the approval of the stakeholders, along with: 
Screening criteria that can be used to ensure solutions meet the minimum 
requirements of the system before the solutions are fully designed, 
modeled and analyzed and an initial quantitative methodology for 
evaluating how well solutions meet the values of stakeholders in solving 
the correct problem. (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008,  
p. 266) 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The first step in the problem definition phase is identifying the relevant 
stakeholders and eliciting their input regarding their needs or desires regarding the 
problem and system being addressed.  Stakeholders are individuals who have a vested 
interest in the problem and its solution, and can be owners, users, managers, customers, 
clients, administrators, maintainers, and regulators of the system.  These stakeholders 
often have varying perspectives on desired system functions, end states, and 
requirements.  In order to assess the needs of the stakeholders, stakeholder interviews and 
surveys were used to assist in the identification of the key issues.  The following are 




a. Department of Defense (DoD) 
The United States DoD is currently a recognized expert in the field of 
IEDs and C-IED technology, due to its extensive research and technology developments.  
The United States military is currently funding and training personnel in efforts to defeat 
IEDs, conduct academic and field research, development and testing of sensor systems, 
and relooking tactics, techniques, and procedures in C-IED. 
b. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
(JIEDDO) 
JIEDDO’s mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DoD actions 
in support of combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task forces’ efforts to 
defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence (JIEDDO, 2008).  Their research is broken 
down into three main categories:  attack the network by preventing the emplacement of 
the IED by attacking enemy vulnerabilities at multiple points in the IED system; 
defeating the device by defeating the IED once it is emplaced; and training the force by 
facilitating the establishment and growth of coalition and partner nation  
C-IED capabilities. 
2. Users 
a. Brigade and Battalion Commanders 
These commanders are responsible for executing their assigned missions 
within their area of operations.  These commanders must have SA during all phases of 
their deployments and each tactical operation to which they commit troops.  Ideally, 
commanders at this level will have access to up-to-date imagery, with detailed 
intelligence analysis at their fingertips.  Various lieutenant colonels, battalion 
commanders, and brigade staff officers were contacted via secure internet protocol router 
network (SIPRNET) during their deployments in the summer and fall of 2008.  These 
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individuals provided real-time desires and assisted in the development of the top-level 
system requirements and MOPs, which were incorporated into a survey for staff officer 
and company-grade officer feedback. 
b. Staff Officers and Company-grade Leadership 
These individuals are responsible for preparing intelligence reports for 
higher commanders, executing specific tactical missions, and briefing Soldiers on current 
enemy situations.  These officers made up the majority of those surveyed, and were large 
contributors to the development and weighting of the MOPs as well as the analysis  
of alternatives. 
c. The Individual Soldier 
The Soldier on the ground is responsible for executing specified missions 
from his company leadership.  These Soldiers are impacted the most by the decisions 
made by higher leadership based on the human intelligence, unmanned sensors, ground 
cameras, and robotics.  Since there were no Army enlisted personnel at the  
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at the time the survey was administered, their input is 
missing from this analysis. 
d. Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) 
EOD teams have the ability to locate the exact position of a suspected 
IED, identify and classify it, conduct render safe procedures, and provide safe transport 
and final disposal of the IED (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001).  Many 
techniques and technologies exist for EOD utilization and selection of a technique often 
depends on the proximity of the IED to people or critical facilities.  IEDs that are located 
on busy road or near personnel are handled very differently from those in  
remote locations. 
3. Analysts 
The C-IED fight is an area of high priority for our nation and numerous 
organizations are currently involved in research.  JIEDDO (through research at NPS and 
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other academic institutions), the research and development corporation RAND, the 
defense advanced research projects agency (DARPA), DoD military intelligence units, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) are just 
a few of the organizations conducting research in unmanned sensors, and  
C-IED operations. 
4. Others 
There are a number of people who are impacted by IEDs.  Host nation civilians, 
the media, military family members, members of the Senate and Congress, and American 
taxpayers all have a vested interest in the improvement of SA in the C-IED fight. 
5. Key Stakeholders 
 Direct stakeholder input from two sources helped to frame the problem, and 
ensure the tactical and technical needs were being addressed.  The tactical contributors 
provided information via email interviews and as survey respondents, and consisted of 
the Army officers listed in Appendix B.  The technical opinions were gathered from 
various interviews with members of sensor technology companies and several research 
development teams during the Defeating Improvised Devices Meeting held in San Diego 
on 21-22 October 2008. 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis is the process of identifying the system functions and 
interfaces required to meet the system’s performance objectives.  It is imperative to 





1. Operational Scenario 
In order to perform a functional analysis, an operational scenario must be defined 
in which to evaluate the problem.  While the intent of this research is not to propose a 
specific, detailed scenario to provide context for systems design, we do identify an 
important category of scenarios for consideration. 
A common operational scenario faced in the C-IED environment is distinguishing 
IEDs from garbage on the road or detecting disturbed soil.  The Marine Corps 
Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) has developed numerous variations 
based on this operational scenario.  One variation, shown in Figure 23, focuses on 
monitoring friendly and enemy activity, finding emplaced RCIEDs, and recognizing 
disturbed soil patterns within one unit’s area of operations.  In this scenario, the unit is 
concerned with monitoring an AO that contains approximately 20 miles of paved roads 
traveling outside of an urban environment.  Within the unit’s assigned area of operations 
there are main supply routes (MSR), or lines of communications (LOCs), which connect 
various forward operating bases (FOBs), outposts (OPs), or local towns.  These MSRs 
and LOCs are traveled numerous times a day by various types of military and civilian 
vehicles as well as coalition foot patrols and the local populace.  These routes are located 
outside of a large urban area and are alongside host-nation homes, gardens, or fields. 
Unmanned sensor operators are tasked with observing, detecting, identifying, and 
classifying emplaced RCIEDs or disturbed soil along these routes, based on the suspected 




Figure 23.   C-IED operational scenario 
2. Functional Flow 
a. Enemy Decision Cycle 
Unmanned sensor technology may be of assistance in detecting terrorists 
during numerous phases of the operation.  Sensors can track individuals during 
reconnaissance missions, rehearsals, delivery and emplacement of an IED, observation of 
the explosion, and during their escape.  The following functional flow diagram, shown in 
Figure 24, visually organizes the steps a terrorist must take in order to successfully 




























































Figure 24.   Functional flow diagram of a terrorist attack 
(After:  Diagram provided by Dr. Robert Harney, NPS, 2008)  
 
A terrorist is most vulnerable to detection, identification, and capture 
during the rehearsal of the attack through escape effects and primarily in the highlighted 
portion above, while delivering and emplacing the IED.  This enemy decision cycle 
functional flow diagram displays the need for a friendly system that can: 
 Observe a sector. 
 Detect suspicious activity. 
 Provide decision makers with usable information that allows for 
quick and decisive actions. 
b. Friendly Forces Analysis 
A functional flow diagram for friendly forces’ actions in a C-IED mission 
and its utilization of unmanned sensors is shown in Figure 25.  A UAS C-IED flight 
pattern, or unmanned sensor, emplacement begins with the mission receipt and the 
deployment of assets to an assigned area of operation.  Once the assets are emplaced, 
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search parameters are inputted to begin gathering data.  The observation phase begins 
once the sensor begins its sector search and includes the processing of the data.  The data 
is either sent simultaneously to the user and analysts, or stored on board for downloading 
at a later time.  Once data is received by the analysts, the data is fused and analyzed.  
While this fusion and analysis are time consuming, the detection phase occurs as objects 
or activities are identified and classified throughout the process.  Objects of interest or 
suspicious activities are annotated and verified, if possible, before being transmitted to 
the user.  Once the data is received by the user, the battle management phase begins, as 
the user utilizes this data to establish a COP and conduct analysis.  At this point, a 
decision point is reached where the user can choose to take action or can request 
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Figure 25.   Friendly forces functional flow diagram 
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3. Input-Output Model 
 An input-output model assists in the development of the functional hierarchy and 
describes the controllable and uncontrollable inputs to a system and the intended outputs 
and by-products of the system.  The input-out model, shown in Figure 26, helped to 
identify and categorize the inputs and outputs for the desired C-IED system, which 
focuses on providing improved SA.  The controllable inputs are those that can be 
measured, calculated, built, or compiled by the designers in the developmental and test 
and evaluation phases.  These aspects were categorized into physical, human, 
informational, and economical.  The physical inputs included sensor characteristics 
(weight, dimensions, speed, resolution, datalinks, payload, etc.), and surveillance time.  
The human inputs included TTPs and doctrine, organization, training, material, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).  In fact, the combination 
of physical and human inputs reflects that the potential alternatives have both material 
and nonmaterial components, which is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
 The informational inputs included the technical manuals available for training and 
maintenance of equipment, information gathered from ongoing operations, and 
information received from psychological operations.  The economic inputs include the 
cost for acquisition and maintenance of the system. 
 The uncontrollable inputs are those aspects that are beyond the control of the 
designers and were categorized into physical, human, and informational.  Physical inputs 
include environmental conditions including the weather and time of day; human inputs 
include enemy TTPs, target selection, and the demographics of the local populace; and 
informational inputs include the type of IED the enemy chooses to emplace. 
 The intended outputs of a system are those which are essential to providing 
improved SA to friendly forces that may encounter IEDs.  These outputs include the 
correct detection, classification, identification and countering of the IED, rapid 
transmission of imagery across the battlefield, and an improved COP and SA for 
commanders and the individual Soldier.  Though the system of systems is designed to 
counter IEDs, several unintended outputs will inevitably result and are referred to as  
by-products.  The positive by-products of the system include fewer casualties and 
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incidents, and better relations with the local populace.  The potentially negative  
by-products of the system include false detections, identifications or classifications, the 
enemy’s development of better IEDs and technology, and the enemy’s improvement of 
organization and recruiting. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Input-output model  
4. Objectives Hierarchy 
The objectives hierarchy serves as the foundation for the assessment of the 
candidate solution designs (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008).  It typically begins 
with a single, overarching, top-level objective from which subobjectives, or functions, 
derive.  The top-level objective is also the revised problem statement, based on the 
development of the functional flow diagram, input-output model, as well as input from 
stakeholders. 
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The revised problem statement is as follows:  Design a system that, through the 
use of unmanned sensors, provides effective and efficient SA to the commander in a  
C-IED scenario.  By effective, the system must maximize the ability to process sensor 
imagery, detect, classify, identify, and counter IEDs.  To be efficient, the system must 
address important characteristics of operational suitability and survivability.  Thus, 
providing SA, maximizing operational suitability, and maximizing Soldier survivability 
are the top-level objectives in the effective employment of unmanned sensors in C-IED.  
The top level objectives of the objectives hierarchy are shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Top-level objectives of objectives hierarchy 
5. Situational Awareness (SA) Defined 
While Operational Suitability and Soldier Survivability have clearly defined 
objectives and are widely used in military test and evaluation, the role of providing SA in 
the effective employment of unmanned sensor systems in C-IED needs further defining.  
We propose that a complete and useful description of SA in this circumstance should be 
based on a sensible, generic theoretical model of SA and then fully built through the 
inclusion of military concerns, such as the commander’s priorities. 
a. A Generic SA Model 
SA can be difficult to measure and, at times, even harder to establish.  
While specific definitions and applications for SA have been developed for military 
problems, broader visions and models of SA have also been proposed.  For example, the 
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model in Figure 28, developed by Dr. Mica Endsley, presents three levels in the creation 
of SA:  perception (level 1), comprehension (level 2), and projection (level 3).  
Perception includes perceiving the status, attributes, and dynamics of the elements within 
a given environment.  Achieving level 1, or perception, includes the process of 
monitoring, cue detection, and recognition.  Perception leads to an awareness of multiple 
situational elements including objects, events, environmental factors, people, systems, 
and their current locations, modes, or actions.  Comprehension (level 2) is pattern 
recognition, interpretation, and evaluation.  Achieving level 2 involves a synthesis of 
disjointed level 1 SA elements through the process of pattern recognition, interpretation, 
and evaluation.  This level requires the integration of this information in order to 
understand how it may impact goals and objects.  Level 2 involves developing a 
comprehensive picture of the world or, in this research, a COP.  Projection (level 3) 
involves the ability to predict the future actions of elements in the environment.  This is 
achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements and 
comprehension of the situation through levels 1 and 2, and then extrapolating this 
information forward in time to determine how it will affect future states of the operational 
environment (Endsley, 1995). 
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Figure 28.   Model of SA in decision making (From:  Endsley, 1995) 
b. Army Approach to SA 
Commanders and their staffs develop information priorities in order to 
make better decisions.  The general term for this essential information is Commanders 
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), which is defined as: 
Comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the 
commander as being critical in facilitating timely information 
management and the decision making progress that affect successful 
mission accomplishment.  The three key subcomponents are the essential 
elements of friendly information (EEFI), friend force information 
requirements (FFIRs), and priority intelligence requirements (PIR). 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004, p. 1-34) 
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The commander is often forced to make decisions with an incomplete view of the 
battlefield and selects CCIRs that assist in information gain.  There are three types of 
CCIR:  enemy or threat, friendly, and environmental.  The most important component of 
CCIR is PIR, which is defined as: 
Those intelligent requirements about the enemy and environment for 
which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of 
planning and decision-making.  They are often associated with a decision 
that will critically affect the overall success of the command’s mission. 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004, p. 1-150) 
 The relationship between information, CCIRs, and command decision 
points (DP) is illustrated in Figure 29. 
 
 






Information gathered across the battlefield that answers a commander’s 
CCIRs assists in effective decision making.  SA helps commanders make critical 
decisions using information based more on facts than assumptions, and also reduces the 
risk involved in decision making. 
There are various techniques that are often used to measure SA.  Military 
professionals commonly describe operations in terms of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, 
Troops, and Time Available (METT-T) in order to plan and execute operations 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997).  METT-T provides a good breakdown of 
a commander’s desired informational elements and provides a start point for determining 
what factors must be known in order to establish SA.  These elements are ever-changing, 
and each operational scenario will have its own unique considerations.  However, in the 
C-IED fight, commanders are interested in the location of already emplaced IEDs as well 
as the ability to track the enemy network involved in the IED process.  The enemy is a 
key component of SA in any operational environment, and in the C-IED fight, the IED 
and the network are the strategic enemies of choice.  SA also includes observing the 
battlespace, processing input from those observations, and developing an understanding 
of the environment, which includes both friendly actions and threat activity.  SA in the  
C-IED fight includes the ability to observe the battlefield, process imagery, and 
understand the operational environment. 
c. Linking Army SA with Endsley Model 
Endsley’s model provides an excellent framework for describing specific 
military concerns regarding SA.  Applying Endsley’s model to Army operations and 
Army SA focus, it is reasonable to state that achieving level 1 SA in the C-IED fight 
includes the ability to observe the battlefield utilizing human intelligence (HUMINT) and 
signal intelligence (SIGINT).  SIGINT must be processed into quality and valuable 
information prior to being of use to a commander.  Additionally, achieving level 2 SA in 
the C-IED fight includes the ability to monitor and recognize convoys, friendly, neutral 
and enemy forces, as well as environmental factors.  Commanders need to be able to 
determine pattern recognition, and see disturbed soil patches.  Ideally, multiple Soldiers 
on the ground, commanders in tactical operation centers (TOC), and data analysts would 
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have access to the same imagery and be able to determine the attributes and dynamics of 
hostile events and forces.  Figure 30 shows clear linkage between Endsley’s model and 
achieving SA in the C-IED fight.  A more detailed discussion of the components of the 
Activity Diagram, and how they relate to the objectives hierarchy, is found below. 
 
  
Figure 30.   Activity diagram for achieving SA in C-IED (After:  Endsley, 1995) 
D. VALUE MODEL 
Value modeling provides “an initial methodology for evaluating candidate 
solutions” (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008, p. 289).  Value modeling consists of 
both qualitative and quantitative models, which assist in evaluating the future value of the 
implemented solution to the problem. 
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1. Qualitative Value Model 
The qualitative value model strives to present the most important functions and 
objectives for the system, and is more important than the quantitative model because it 
reflects the key stakeholder values regarding the system (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 
2008). 
a. Provide SA 
Utilizing the activity diagram above, the top level functions for providing 
SA are:  observe, process information from sensors, and understand the environment.  
While there may be additional components of SA, the ability to observe one’s area of 
operation, process sensor imagery, and understand the operating environment serve as 
key components in information gain, establishing a COP, and generating SA. 
Observation of the battlefield is achieved via HUMINT and SIGINT.  
Squads on patrol, Soldier interaction with the local populace, interrogation of detainees, 
and informants are all forms of HUMINT.  While HUMINT is an important component 
of observation on the battlefield, this research focuses solely on the utilization of 
SIGINT.  Manned and unmanned sensors are the key components of SIGINT and provide 
a commander either still imagery or streaming video of designated target or observation 
areas.  Sensors have varying payloads, resolution capabilities, bandwidth restrictions, and 
available spectrums in which to perform surveillance operations.  A sensor’s image 
quality is a function of the bandwidth available from satellites, the image resolution, and 
the display resolution (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, 2008).  Digital image resolution and display resolution is 
measured by the pixel count with a set of two positive integers; the first number is the 
number of pixel columns (width) and the second is the number of pixel rows (height) 
(Kerlin, 2009).  A pixel is one of the many tiny dots that make up the representation of a 
picture in a computer's memory.  Larger payloads on sensor systems mean more 
capability to carry a variety of equipment.  Therefore, the MOPs for the observe  
function are: 
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 Quality of imagery:  bandwidth available from satellites (higher is 
better), the image resolution (higher pixel count is better), and the 
display resolution (higher pixel count is better). 
 Surveillance coverage:  percentage of roadway in AO covered in a  
24-hour period (higher is better). 
 Sensor payload capacity in pounds (higher is better). 
 The data received from unmanned systems must be processed in order to 
provide commanders with useful information.  Information consists of two critical 
attributes:  value and quality (Perry, 2000).  Information has value if “it informs the 
commander and thereby adds to his knowledge of the combat situation” (Perry, 2000,  
p. 3).  Information has value in providing SA if it answers or assists in answering CCIRs.  
Information quality consists of three components:  accuracy, timeliness, and 
completeness (Perry, 2000).  Therefore, when providing SA in combat operations, it is 
imperative to utilize functions that contribute to providing a commander with both 
valuable and quality information. 
Accurate and complete information in combat operations is enhanced by 
unmanned sensors when data fusion occurs to combine all available information (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008).  
Data fusion is the process of putting together information obtained from many 
heterogeneous sensors, on many platforms, into a single composite picture of the 
environment.  Emerging technology allows for imagery and videos to be fused utilizing 
meta-data tagging, which are tags describing the data to enable discovery, and include 
time, location, classification, and sensor calibration.  Tags allow data gathered from 
separate sensors to be combined in a meaningful way.  Ideally, meta-data tagging should 
be done at the sensor, rather than having analysts who receive the data tag it.  While the 
meta-data tagging standards and processes are evolving, adoption of these standards in 
sensor systems has been slow. 
Accurate and complete information is of no use to the commander if it 
arrives too late.  The speed in which information is transmitted, processed, and analyzed 
 45
greatly impacts a commander’s ability to act effectively and decisively on the battlefield.  
Therefore, the MOPs for the process function are: 
 Number of sensors with meta-data tagging capability (more is better). 
 Processing time:  the sum of the time it takes an unmanned sensor to 
transmit imagery or video and the time it takes the data to be 
processed, analyzed, and sent to the user (less is better). 
Commanders need useful and valuable information in order to understand 
their environment, which includes detecting IEDs, enemy activity, friendly forces, local 
activity, as well as recognize disturbed soil or track insurgent’s activity patterns.  
Unmanned sensors can be used to identify and classify potential IEDs or investigate 
disturbed soil to negate risk to personnel.  Sensor systems that provide real-time imagery 
for all units operating within an area of operations greatly enhances shared COP. 
Detection is the “actual confirmation of an obstacle” and phase of an 
operation where potential IEDs are identified for further classification and identification 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2000, p. C1).  There are four primary means of 
detecting an obstacle:  visual, physical, electronic, and mechanical (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2000).  Unmanned sensors conduct visual sector searches of a 
unit’s area of operations, electronically locate, and mark possible IEDs.  Visual sector 
searches are intended to increase the amount of surveillance of the routes in the AO and 
increase the number of IEDs detected along the route.  The effectiveness of electronically 
locating and marking IEDs is determined by the probability of detection and probability 
of false detection (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998). 
In order for an IED to be detected by a sensor, it must contain certain 
attributes or characteristics pertaining to IEDs (size, shape, etc.) that define it as a 
potential IED.  Army Field Manual (FM) 3-34.119, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, 
warns that “specific identification features for IEDs are ever-changing based on the 
capabilities and available resources of the enemy” (p. 4-1).  The manual states that IEDs 
share a common set of components: the main charge, initiating system, and casing.  
Attributes of a main charge vary from military munitions (mortar or tank rounds) to 
commercial explosives such as trinitrotoluene (TNT).  Initiating systems vary from 
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simple hard wire to remote control units for garage door openers or toys; however, the 
system will almost always consist of a blasting cap.  Casings for IEDs range in size and 
are used to help hide the IED from plain sight.  FM 3-34.119 states that the primary 
indication of an IED is a change in the environment and lists the following as possible 
roadside IED indicators: 
 Unusual behavior patterns or changes in community patterns. 
 Vehicles following a convoy for a long distance and then pulling to  
the roadside. 
 Personnel using overpasses. 
 Signals from vehicles or bystanders. 
 People videotaping ordinary activities or military actions. 
 Suspicious objects. 
 Metallic objects, such as soda cans and cylinders. 
 Colors that seem out of place, such as freshly disturbed dirt, concrete 
that does not match the surrounding areas, colored detonating cord, or 
other exposed parts of an IED. 
 Markers by the side of the road, such as tires, rock piles, ribbon or tape 
that may identify an IED location to the local population or serve as an 
aiming reference. 
 New or out-of-place objects in an environment, such as dirt piles, 
construction, dead animals, or trash. 
 Graffiti symbols or writings on buildings. 
 Signs that are newly erected or seem out of place. 
 Obstacles in the roadway to channel convoys. 
 Exposed antennas, detonating cord, wires, or ordinance. 
 Wires laid out in plain sight. 
Pattern recognition and being able to compare historical and real-time 
imagery are key components in detecting an IED indicator or attribute.  Pattern 
recognition assists the commander in identifying suspicious behavior of the local 
 
 47
populace and monitoring traffic patterns.  Comparing historical and real-time imagery 
allows analysts to quickly note areas where the ground has been disturbed, roadside 
debris, or markers on the side of the road. 
Intelligence analysts may convert these indicators into IED attributes 
based off of the commander’s CCIR or PIR.  These specified attributes can then be used 
in a mathematical model, Bayes’ theorem, to determine a sensor’s probability of 
detection or probability of false detection.  Bayes’ theorem relates the conditional and 
marginal probabilities of two random events and is then used to compute posterior 
probabilities (Ragsdale, 2007).  In the event of trying to detect IEDs through the use of 
sensor, the sensor’s probability of detection is conditional on the marginal probability of 
an IED attribute being present or not present.  For this calculation to be of use to the 
analyst, it must be based on real data, as the specific conditional probabilities must be 
determined through the use of historical data and analysis.  The probabilities of detection 
and false detection are calculated for an entire unmanned sensor system—not for a  
single sensor. 
 Probability of Detection:  probability that sensor system can make 
the proper determination that an object has attributes of an IED 
(higher is better): 
Pr(sensor detects attribute) = Pr(sensor detects attribute │attribute present) 
 * Pr(attribute present)+ Pr(sensor detects attribute │attribute not 
 present)* Pr(attribute not present) 
 Probability of False Detection:  probability that the system makes 
the wrong determination as to the presence of an IED attribute 
(lower is better): 
Pr (sensor not detect attribute)=Pr(sensor not detect attribute│attribute 
 present)* Pr(attribute present) + Pr(sensor not detect 
 attribute)│(attribute not present)* Pr(attribute not present) 
Identification and classification of an IED is when a possible IED has been 
detected and is further investigated to determine the identification of the IED.  While the 
detection of the IED may be done by passive surveillance (UAS or cameras), active 
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surveillance (UGV, or Soldier reports) or a combination of both, identification and 
classification is primarily done by active surveillance measures, specifically EOD or 
UGVs (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998).  The probabilities of identification 
and false identification are also calculated using Bayes theorem and are conditional on 
the probability of an IED being present.  Again, this calculation must be based on real 
data, as the specific conditional probabilities must be determined through the use of 
historical data and analysis.  The probabilities of identification and false identification are 
calculated for an entire unmanned sensor system—not for a single sensor:   
 Probability of Identification:  the probability that a system can 
make the proper identification and classification of the IED (higher 
is better): 
Pr(sensor identifies IED) = Pr(sensor identifies IED│IED present)  * 
 Pr(IED present)+ Pr(sensor identifies IED│IED not present)* 
 Pr(IED not present) 
 Probability of False Identification: probability that the system 
makes the wrong identification and classification of the IED (lower 
is better): 
Pr (sensor not identify IED)=Pr(sensor not identify IED│IED
 present)* Pr(IED present) + Pr(sensor not identify IED)│(IED not 
 present) * Pr(IED not present) 
Understanding the environment can also be enhanced by the availability of 
real-time imagery for all units operating within the area of operations (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008).  
Situational awareness across the battlefield is greatly enhanced if commanders operating 
out of TOCs are able to speak with convoys or Soldiers on foot patrol, while accessing 





video feed or high-resolution imagery allows for collaborative efforts across the 
battlefield in dealing with a multitude of situations, and contributes to the completeness 
of information. 
 Number of units with real-time imagery (higher is better) 
b. Provide Operational Suitability 
Operational suitability is not intended as a physical attribute of the system, 
or what the system does, but instead measures the characteristics of the system.  
Operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in field 
use with respect to reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM), supportability, 
human systems integration (HSI), and interoperability. 
This research focuses on the impact of reliability and maintainability in 
the emplacement of unmanned sensor systems in the C-IED fight.  These two 
components were selected because they are important considerations from both the 
system and individual Soldier perspective.  Equipment utilized in combat must be able to 
perform at a high performance level for a sustained period of time.  When new or updated 
systems are introduced without sufficient operational testing or with an expedited time 
line, military maintenance capabilities are limited. 
The first component of RAM is reliability, which is the duration or 
probability of failure-free performance under stated conditions (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006).  Mission reliability is the probability of no critical failure under specified mission 
conditions for the overall system of sensors and communications links.  There are 
numerous ways to characterize the reliability of a system, including failure mode effects 
analysis, fault trees, and reliability block diagrams (RBD).  An RBD is  
A graphical representation of the reliability dependence of a system on its 
components.  It is a directed, acyclic graph.  Each path through the graph 
represents a subset of system components, and if the components in that 
path are operational, the system is operational.  Component lives are 
usually assumed to be independent in a RBD.  Simple topologies include a 
series system, a parallel system, a k of n system, and combinations of 
these. (Schrady & Olwell, 2002, ref p. 3-6) 
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An RBD for an alternative with one satellite system, one UAS, one UGV, 
and one stationary camera platform is best constructed using a series system and is shown 
in Figure 31. 
 
  
Figure 31.   RBD for unmanned sensors in series 
 
In a series system, if any block fails the entire system fails.  This type of RBD was 
selected because this research focuses on providing SA utilizing an entire unmanned 
sensor system, not just a single sensor.  While imagery and video-feeds may be available 
utilizing just one sensor platform, the system would not be operating as intended and in 
fact would be severely degraded.  The following definitions are used in order to calculate 
the overall system reliability for this series system: 
  R(A):  is the reliability of the satellite system 
  R(B):  is the reliability of the UAS 
  R(C):  is the reliability of the UGV 
  R(D):  is the reliability of the camera system 
The system’s reliability, at time t, is calculated: 
  RS=R(A)*R(B)*R(C)*R(D) (the higher the better) 
Maintainability is the ability of an item to be retained in, or restored to, a 
specific condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill 
levels, using prescribed procedures and resources at each prescribed level of maintenance 
and repair. 
 Percentage of appropriate maintenance personnel trained to repair 
equipment (higher is better). 
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 Percentage of repair parts available in unit level logistics system 
(higher  
is better). 
c. Provide Soldier Survivability 
In general, Soldier survivability consists of six key components:  reduce 
fratricide, reduce detectability of the Soldier, reduce probability of being attacked, 
minimize damage, minimize injury, and reduce physical and mental fatigue (Payan & 
Zigler, 2008).  It terms of providing SA in the C-IED fight utilizing unmanned sensors, 
the key component of maximizing Soldier survivability is reducing physical and mental 
fatigue on the Soldier.  Reducing physical and mental fatigue is measured by the 
physical, cognitive, and workload constraints placed on the Soldier by the system (Payan 
& Zigler, 2008). 
 Reduce training time (less is better). 
 Reduce physical workload (less is better). 
 The objectives hierarchy, shown in Figure 32, shows the relationship of 
the three top-level objectives and their subojectives, and serves as the foundation for 
assessing the selected alternatives. 
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Figure 32.   Qualitative value model 
2. Quantitative Value Model 
Quantitative value modeling “allows us to determine how well candidate solutions 
to our systems decision problem attain the stakeholder values” (Parnell, Driscoll, & 
Henderson, 2008, p. 294).  More specifically, applying value functions (or utility 
functions) to metrics provides both a means of essentially normalizing quantitative data 
so that different units of measure are irrelevant, and a way of clearly showing relative 
value of all possible outcomes for each metric. 
a. Survey 
A survey was developed to update and possibly improve the proposed 
functions, objectives, and metrics.  This survey was designed to see if there were key 
pieces missing in the analysis, possibly establish weights for the proposed MOPs for use 
in modeling, and to see what the war-fighter felt about the utilization of each subset of 
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unmanned sensors in the C-IED fight.  The intended audience was active duty Army 
officers currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School in the winter of 2009, with 
deployment experience defined as six months or more in either Iraq or Afghanistan  
since 2003. 
There was very little demographic information obtained from the 
respondents; however, in order to ensure the survey sample represented the desired 
population of Army officers who have deployed, the respondents were asked to provide 
how many times they had deployed (for at least six months) to either Iraq or Afghanistan 
since 2003.  There were follow-on questions to determine at what level the respondent 
worked, and what type of unit they were in as well as the position they held for each 
deployment they participated in.  No other specific demographic information was 
collected; however, a respondent’s rank could be determined based on some of the 
positions they may have held. 
Upon establishing the deployment information, respondents were asked to 
provide their level of agreement with the Army’s definition of SA, their opinions on the 
proposed functions, objectives, and MOPs in providing SA in the C-IED fight, thoughts 
on what unmanned sensor systems they felt were most effective or ineffective in their  
C-IED experiences, as well as an opportunity to provide open-ended feedback.  Probably 
the most significant input from the respondents involved their opinions of the value of the 
various metrics under consideration.  This input was key to determining the value 
functions described in the following section.  The survey is enclosed in Appendix A, and 
a snapshot of the survey is shown in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33.   Example survey question 
 
Of the 84 students who received an invitation to take part in the survey,  
28 completed the survey, 2 partially completed the survey, and 54 did not participate.  Of 
the 28 students who completed the survey, 3 had never deployed, 14 deployed once,  
9 deployed twice, and 2 had deployed 3 or more times.  None of the students had worked 
on a Divisional Staff, although 1 student worked on Central Command (CENTCOM) 
staff and another was a part of III Corps Headquarters.  The majority of students who 
deployed worked in a BCT (64%) in some capacity—either on Brigade Staff (17%), 
Battalion Staff (14%), or as Company Commanders (33%).  This appeared to be a 
representative sample of the desired population—officers that have deployed in a BCT.  
There were also students who had deployed as members of small military transition 
teams (MITT) or as part of an EOD detachment. 
b. Generating Value Functions for Each Metric or MOP 
The responses from the survey, stakeholder input, and analysis were used 
to assist in the development of value measure functions.  The value function for each 
metric is described below, with a chart displaying the weights used and a graph that 
shows the shape of each value function. 
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3. Quality of Imagery 
 Quality of imagery is measured by the bandwidth available from satellites with 
larger bandwidth rates returning higher resolution of imagery.  The current WGS 
constellations offer users between 1-3 gigabytes per second (Gbps) of bandwidth (NSCC 
Study Guide, 2003).  There is very little difference between images gained utilizing  
1-3 Gpbs, although this difference in the amount of bandwidth available will decrease 
total processing time, it has little bearing on the quality of imagery.  A single TSAT 
satellite may provide users with 10 Gbps of bandwidth and the full constellation is 
estimated to provide 40 Gbps of accessible bandwidth for the tactical user (Katzman, 
2006).  The estimated value for available bandwidth and graph of the value function are 
shown in Figure 34. 
 
  
Figure 34.   Quality of imagery value measure function 
4. Surveillance Coverage 
 Surveillance coverage is measured by the percentage of roadway in the AO 
covered in a 24-hour period, with higher percentages resulting in greater value to the 
commander.  Sensor systems with limited fuel, battery capacity, or endurance capability 
may result in information gaps and decrease the value of the system.  While UAS with 
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higher flight ceilings may be able to cover greater distances, stationary cameras provide 
constant coverage of selected high-risk areas.  The estimated value for surveillance 
coverage and the resultant return to scale graph of the value function are shown in  
Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35.   Surveillance coverage value measure function 
5. Payload Capacity 
 A sensor system that has the capacity to carry a heavy payload allows for greater 
flexibility in swapping out older systems with updated versions that may have higher 
weight requirements.  Payload weight capabilities are increasing, meaning more variety 
and sizes of payloads can be made available.  Physical sensor capabilities change more 
slowly than payload capabilities so users may choose to upgrade the payload before 
sensor itself.  In many cases, it is the payloads’ capabilities that become the mission’s 
bottleneck and therefore crucial for mission success (Frost & Sullivan, 2005).  The ability 
to carry various sensor platforms allows for mix and matching of visual cameras for 
viewing live footage, electro-optic, and IR sensors for day and night surveillance and 
thermal imaging, and two types of radar (synthetic aperture radar and motion direction 
indication) (Frost & Sullivan, 2005).  Stand-alone systems with just visual cameras carry 
a payload of about 2 lbs (Goebel, 2009) and fully loaded systems operating at the Brigade 
level usually require a payload capacity of 75 lbs (DragonFly Pictures, 2009), therefore 
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systems operating at the BCT level’s value greatly increases at 75 lbs.  The estimated 
value for payload capacity, and the resultant graph of the value function are shown in 
Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36.   Payload capacity value measure function 
6. Meta-Data Tagging 
 Maximizing the number of sensors operating under a BCT’s control that have 
meta-data tagging capability improves a commander’s quality of information.  The limits 
of the x-axis are set for the number of sensors with meta-data tagging capability for what 
an ideal solution and worst-feasible solution would have for the number of sensors with 
meta-data tagging capability.  Utilizing our operational scenario, we assume the 
maximum number of unmanned sensors operating in a BCT’s AO is five and the 
minimum is the absence of meta-data tagging for all sensors or zero.  If only one sensor 
has meta-data tagging capability, the system’s value is increased very little, since this 
data may be merged with imagery from higher platforms, but has little utility for the 
immediate users within the BCT.  The value increases at a much higher rate for two or 
more sensors, since data within the BCT can now be fused to create a more complete and 
accurate set of information for the commander, and results in an estimated concave return 
to scale curve, shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37.   Meta-data tagging value measure function 
7. Processing Time 
 Minimizing the amount of time it takes an unmanned sensor to transmit imagery 
or video and the time it takes the data to be processed, analyzed, and sent to the 
commander improves the timeliness of information gain.  Current imagery transmit times 
can take over 12 minutes for streaming video, while updated systems are projected to cut 
this to under a second (Katzman, 2006).  The lack of meta-data tagging and data fusion 
software for current systems delay analysis, while the combination of these capabilities 
would dramatically improve the analysis process.  The estimated value for payload 
capacity, and the resultant decreasing return to scale graph of the value function, are 
shown in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38.   Processing time value measure function 
8. Units with Real-time Imagery 
 The value measure function for real-time imagery was created utilizing the 
operational scenario and assuming there are five or fewer units capable of receiving real-
time imagery within the BCT’s area of operations.  Situational awareness across the 
battlefield improves as the number of units with shared real-time imagery increases 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
2008).  The estimated value for units with real-time imagery, and the resultant linear 
return to scale graph of the value function, are shown in Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Real-time imagery value measure function 
 60
9. Probability of Detection and Identification 
 Maximizing a sensor’s probability of detection and probability of identification 
improves the accuracy and value of a commander’s information gain.  The higher the 
probability of detection and identification, the fewer Soldiers that are put at risk.  
Similarly, the lower the probability of false detection and false identification improves 
the accuracy and value of a commander’s information gain.  Sensor systems that are able 
to properly detect and identify IEDs allow commanders to quickly take action to 
neutralize the threat and decrease the threat to coalition forces and the local populace.  
High probabilities of detection and identification as well as low false detection and false 
identification rates were greatly valued by survey respondents.  The estimated value for 
the probability of detection, probability of false detection, probability of identification, 
probability of false identification, and the resultant return to scale graphs of the value 
functions are shown in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40.   Detection and identification value measure functions 
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10. Reliability 
 The reliability of an unmanned sensor system is dependent on the reliability of 
each sensor operating within the system.  Calculating reliability of the system using a 
series RBD means that each sensor must be operating as intended for the system to 
function properly—the higher the overall system reliability, the greater the system’s 
value to the commander.  The estimated value for reliability, and the resultant return to 
scale graph of the value function, are shown in Figure 41. 
 
 
Figure 41.   Reliability value measure functions 
11. Maintainability 
Maintainability is the ability of an item to be retained in or restored to a specific 
condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels, 
using prescribed procedures and resources at each prescribed level of maintenance and 
repair.  The percentage of maintenance personnel trained to repair unmanned sensor 
system equipment within a BCT greatly improves the systems’ life span and contributes 
to greater system maintainability.  The percentage of repair parts available in the  
unit-level logistics system decreases a system’s down time.  The estimated value for 
percentage of maintenance personnel trained to repair unmanned sensor systems, the 
percentage of repair parts available in the unit-level logistics system, and the resultant 
return to scale graph of the value functions are shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42.   Maintenance value measure functions 
12. Soldier Survivability 
It terms of providing SA in the C-IED fight utilizing unmanned sensors, the key 
component of maximizing Soldier survivability is reducing physical and mental fatigue 
on the Soldier.  Reducing physical and mental fatigue is measured by the physical, 
cognitive, and workload constraints placed on the Soldier by the system (Payan & Zigler, 
2008).  Reducing the total training time and physical workload for Soldiers frees up time 
for performance of primary duties, rest, or gaining proficiency in operational tasks.  
Measuring the actual training time or physical workload required by an individual Soldier 
for each sensor system is difficult to estimate.  The values for these functions were 
estimated comparing the potential systems impact on a unit in comparison to the current 
system.  A constructive scale, with the following values, was used to compare the 
alternative to the current system: 
 –1 worse than current system. 
 0 same as current system. 
 +1 marginal improvement to current system. 
 +2 some improvement to current system. 
 +3 significant improvement to current system. 
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The estimated value for individual Soldier training time for a complete system, the value 
for the physical workload, and the resultant return to scale graph of the value functions 
are shown in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43.   Survivability value measure functions 
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IV. SOLUTION DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
The second phase of the systems engineering process is solution design and 
consists of generation of alternatives and solution analysis.  Alternatives will provide the 
decision makers with a variety of possible solution sets to a single problem.  Each 
alternative has its own inherent risks and uncertainties, which are identified and described 
so that the decision maker has a clear picture of possible trade-offs, shortcomings, and 
appropriate mitigation techniques. 
To ensure that all the significant system functions, as described in the functional 
hierarchy and reviewed in the objectives hierarchy, are adequately addressed in the 
generation of alternatives, the system design elements are broken down into partitions or 
sectors.  These partitions reflect those major system functions, and through the use of a 
morphological box each of the sectors, are allocated to possible hardware systems or 
technologies under development.  This technique is often called functional allocation 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006).  Brainstorming is an essential step in functional 
allocation, as it is utilized to place solution possibilities in the morphological box, shown 
in Table 6.  A morphological box divides a problem into segments and identifies several 
solutions for each segment (Buede, 2000).  The three functions (observation, information 
processing, understanding the environment) are listed above the potential solutions, 
which represent specific instantiations of ways to achieve the desired function.  For 
example, while each item listed in the observe sector has the capability to perform some 
type of observation, its placement as an option does not mean that using only that item 
maximizes the observe function.  Pairing of various systems within each category, or 
from multiple categories, may result in better observation techniques than utilizing just a 
single asset.  Essentially, this morphological box covers the potential human components, 
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Table 6.   Morphological Box of functions and options 
B. GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
The generation of alternatives is based on the conduct of design synthesis.  
Synthesis is the “creative process of putting known things together into new and more 
useful combinations.  Meeting a need in compliance with customer requirements is the 
objective of design synthesis” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, p. 40).  Therefore, the 
proposed alternatives are comprised of a proposed mix of unmanned sensor systems as 
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described in Chapter II, address the objectives identified and described in Chapter III, and 
are intended to be utilized for the operational scenario as described in Chapter III. 
The baseline system is based on input gathered from officers deployed as a part of 
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during the 
summer and fall of 2008, and the capabilities their BCT emplaced in an operational 
scenario similar to the one utilized in this research.  The “near-term” alternative combines 
unmanned sensor systems that would be available for fielding by 2015 with current 
sensor systems.  The near-term solution includes systems that have completed research 
development tests and are being prepared for fielding.  The “long-term” alternative 
combines satellite systems, and unmanned sensor systems that may be available in the 
next 10-15 years.  All of the systems in the long-term alternative are being considered by 
the military for implementation or continued funding.  Each of the proposed alternatives 
is described in detail below, to include:  system specifications; discussion and graphic of 
“battlefield flow,” or how the synthesized alternative is employed; DOTMLPF 
considerations, particularly nonmaterial aspects of implementing this alternative; and a 
brief summary of drawbacks associated with this alternative.  Table 7 shows the proposed 
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Table 7.   Alternatives 
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1. Alternative 1:  Baseline 
a. Specifications 
A baseline system, shown in Figure 44, was established consisting of 
those sensor systems currently utilized by BCTs deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for the 
operational scenario described in Chapter III.  Current SHF MILSATCOM systems 
consist of the DSCS, WGS, and Milstar.  These satellites are capable of narrow beam 
coverage to stationary command posts (CPs), providing real-time streaming video and 
imagery.  The Raven is managed at the battalion level and is often pushed down to 
maneuver companies.  The Raven is launched by hand and can fly at an altitude of  
1,000 feet, at speeds up to 52 knots.  The MARCbot is pushed down to the maneuver 
company level and divided up among platoons.  MARCbots are small, remote-controlled 
robots that use an attached camera to seek out, identify, and confirm possible IEDs.  The 
majority of the camera systems being used in theater are JLENS and are combined with 
the RAID tower.  The JLENS camera sensor is networked to a Base Defense Operations 
Cell, which projects the video feed with digitized map overlays (Burlas, 2004). 
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Figure 44.   Alternative 1:  Baseline 
b. Battlefield Flow 
The utilization of unmanned sensors in providing SA in the C-IED fight 
begins with the observe phase.  The JLENS/RAID tower provides passive sector search 
capability for line of sight, while the Raven provides a mobile platform that is capable of 
responding to immediate user desires and beyond-line-of-sight search radius. 
Information processing is achieved throughout the transmission as each 
unmanned sensor system sends data to the user.  The JLENS/RAID tower is hard-wired 
into the CP and imagery is received instantaneously.  The JLENS/RAID does not require 
satellite access and its imagery can immediately be analyzed and viewed by the user.  The 
Raven and MARCbot rely on data transfer via satellite for imagery to reach the intended 
user.  The Raven’s data is sent directly to the CP from the satellite, with 5–10 minute 
delays from sending to receiving transmission.  Convoys and Soldiers on the ground are 
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not able to receive imagery from the Raven due to satellite limitations.  The MARCbot’s 
data is sent directly to the Soldier controlling it, is not tied into the Raven’s imagery, is 
not accessible to the CP, and is not received by data analysts. 
Understanding the environment in our operational scenario once an IED is 
suspected requires the utilization of active search measures.  A MARCbot is employed by 
Soldiers on the ground to inspect the suspicious item.  The MARCbot is controlled 
remotely by the Soldier and has an observation range of greater than 300 ft.  The remote 
control unit has a 12-ft antenna, which allows the Soldier controlling the robot to remain 
in an armored vehicle during operation.  While the actual control range is classified, it 
exceeds military recommendations for line-of-sight standoff distance (IEDrobot.com, 
2006).  Only the Soldier controlling the MARCbot is able to view the video feed and 
further voice or data relay between the Soldier and the CP is required for commanders to 
gain information on the suspected IED. 
c. DOTMLPF Implications 
Training and Personnel 
Units are currently receiving predeployment training, including 
maintenance and recovery operations, on all systems included in the baseline system.  
This alternative does not require any additional personnel allocations for a BCT. 
d. Drawbacks 
Current satellite systems lack the bandwidth capabilities to provide users 
with communications on the move, or unified imagery across the battlefield.  The CP is 
the only element in this scenario that is receiving real-time imagery from Raven via the 
satellite and from a direct feed from the JLENS/RAID tower.  The MARCbot’s imagery 
is received only by the Soldier controlling it, and is not accessible to vehicle convoys or 
the CP.  The MARCbot was not designed to physically touch, bump, modify, or attempt 
to disable suspected IEDs and does not have user repair parts (IEDrobot.com, 2006). 
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2. Alternative 2:  Near-Term 
a. Specifications 
The near-term solution includes systems that have completed research 
development tests and are being prepared for fielding.  For Alternative 2, shown in  
Figure 45, the Raven was replaced with the Wasp.  The Wasp has successfully completed 
development and test milestones.  The system is a modular design that allows the aircraft 
to be separated into components and is man-transportable.  It takes two operators to 
launch and can fit into a HMMWV system.  While the Raven must be launched relatively 
close to the desired search area because of its shorter endurance, the Wasp can be 
launched farther away, decreasing the overall risk to personnel.  The Wasp has a faster 
flight speed, 110 knots compared to the Raven’s 52 knots, a higher flight ceiling,  
15,000 ft compared to 1,000 ft, as well as greater flight endurance, 4.5 hrs compared to 




Figure 45.   Alternative 2:  Near-Term 
 
The second unmanned sensor change is the utilization of the MULE 
instead of the MARCbot.  The MULE is an unmanned platform that provides transport of 
equipment and supplies in support of dismounted maneuver and has day and night 
thermal, infrared, and forward-looking imaging systems, which are all JAUS compliant.  
The MULE can also communicate with UASs to provide additional sensor information in 
the development of a COP.  The MULE is projected to be part of the FCS and is designed 
to be maintained with only 10 tools.  The MULE can locate buried IEDs with  
ground-penetrating radar and can neutralize the threat (Govers, 2008). 
b. Battlefield Flow 
The utilization of unmanned sensors in providing SA in the C-IED fight 
begins with the observe phase.  The JLENS/RAID tower provides passive sector search 
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capability for line of sight, while the Wasp provides a mobile platform that is capable of 
responding to immediate user desires and beyond-line-of-sight search radius.  The 
Wasp’s high flight speed and ability to search at high elevations provides faster sector 
searches with greater distances and has little impact on the local populace.  The Wasp’s 
sensor package provides greater resolution than the Raven during both day and night 
operations.  The MULE moves with dismounted patrols and provides additional camera 
angles for 360-degree observation as well as ground-penetrating radar to search for 
buried IEDs. 
Information processing is achieved throughout the transmission as each 
unmanned sensor system sends its data to the user.  The JLENS/RAID tower is  
hard-wired into the CP and imagery is received instantaneously.  The Wasp and MULE 
rely on data transfer via satellite for imagery to reach the intended user.  The Wasp’s data 
is sent directly to the CP from the satellite, with 5–10 minute delays from sending to 
receiving the transmission.  Convoys and Soldiers on the ground are not able to receive 
imagery from the Wasp due to satellite constrictions.  The MULE’s data is sent directly 
to the Soldier controlling it and its imagery can be sent to a UAS, in this case the Wasp, 
for data fusion and transmission to the CP. 
Understanding the environment in our operational scenario once an IED is 
suspected requires the utilization of active search measures.  The MULE’s radar assists in 
the identification and classification of a suspicious item, as well as its neutralization.  The 
commander has access to all imagery and data images with a transmission delay due to 
satellite bandwidth restrictions.  The WGS satellite constellation does not provide for 
communications on the move, so convoys and foot patrols will not have real-time access 
to the same imagery as the CP. 
c. DOTMLPF Implications 
Training 
The Wasp and MULE will require additional predeployment training for 
operators.  The MULE is designed to move with a dismounted patrol, and carries  
ground-penetrating radar capable of neutralizing IEDs.  The MULE will need to be 
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incorporated into unit’s movement drills and should be utilized at military training 
centers prior to a unit’s deployment.  In-theater training is not currently available, and a 
direct fill is not advised for the MULE due to its size and weapons platform (Govers, 
2008).  Maintenance personnel could be trained on unit-level maintenance in theater, but 
a week-long training program is recommended (Govers, 2008). 
A home-station training program is in development for the implementation 
of the Wasp (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).  The Wasp’s maintenance 
training is projected to be included in its initial home-station fielding (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005). 
Personnel 
The Wasp requires a two-person launch team, but the procedure is 
relatively simple and can be launched by Soldiers of any military occupational specialty 
(Dragonfly Pictures, 2009).  The Wasp’s maintenance will not require additional 
maintenance personnel for unit-level maintenance; however, civilian technicians are 
projected to be required for depot level maintenance and certain payload issues (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2007).  The MULE is designed to be maintained with only  
10 tools and will not require personnel changes for a BCT.  Civilian technicians may be 
required for depot-level maintenance and payload issues (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2007). 
d. Drawbacks 
While the Raven is often pushed down to maneuver companies, the Wasp 
will be held at the brigade level and employed for higher mission sets, which limits the 
total number of Wasps employed within a BCT.  The Wasp weighs significantly more 
than the Raven, 475 lbs to 4l lbs, and must be transported by vehicle as opposed to being 
man-portable.  The MULE is a full-sized, 2.5-ton unmanned vehicle and, while it is 
designed to go where the Soldier goes, it is not as portable as the MARCbot. 
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3. Alternative 3:  Long-Term 
a. Specifications 
Alternative 3, as shown in Figure 46, was designed as a possible long-term 
solution set.  The “long-term” alternative combines satellite systems and unmanned 
sensor systems that may be available in the next 10–15 years.  All of the systems in the 
long-term alternative are being considered by the military for implementation or 
continued funding.  The use of the AEHF and TSAT would greatly decrease time to 
receive imagery, since it allows the high-data rate access and provides a data rate of  
2.5 gigabits to 10 gigabits per second through laser communications.  The quality of 
imagery and video resolution are a function of the frequencies used by the sensor and the 
bandwidth allocated from the satellite.  Compared to Milstar, the AEHF system program 
improvements include higher data rates (8.192 Mbps), which allows for a sharper image 
and more bandwidth than the current system. 
 
 
Figure 46.   Alternative 3:  Long-Term 
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The JLENS/ORBIT consists of two systems:  a surveillance system and a 
fire-control system, which includes elevated, long-range surveillance radar and elevated, 
high-performance fire control radar.  Each radar is integrated onto a large aerostat 
connected by a tether to the ground-based mobile mooring station and communications 
processing group.  The JLENS/ORBIT provides for long-duration, wide-area,  
over-the-horizon observation.  Its advanced communication capabilities allow for faster 
data transmission and its advanced sensor package provides greater spatial resolution 
than the JLENS/RAID. 
b. Battlefield Flow 
The utilization of unmanned sensors in providing SA in the C-IED fight 
begins with the observe phase.  The JLENS/ORBIT system provides for passive  
wide-area, over-the-horizon sector search.  The Wasp provides a mobile platform that is 
capable of responding to immediate user desires with quick reaction time.  The 
JLENS/ORBIT and Wasp’s ability to search at high elevations provides larger search 
parameters.  The JLENS/ORBITs advanced sensor package provides greater resolution 
than the JLENS/RAID during both day and night operations.  The MULE moves with 
dismounted patrols and provides additional camera angles for 360-degree observation, as 
well as ground-penetrating radar to search for buried IEDs. 
Information processing is achieved throughout the transmission as each 
unmanned sensor system sends its data to the user.  The use of TSAT and AEHF, instead 
of DSCS, WGS, and Milstar, will have a tremendous impact on battle management.  
Imagery from a UAV that would typically take 2 minutes to process using the Milstar II 
system, or radar imagery from a Global Hawk, which traditionally takes about 12 minutes 
to process, would both take less than a second using TSAT (Katzman, 2006). 
Understanding the environment in our operational scenario becomes 
important once an IED is suspected, and requires the utilization of active search 
measures.  The MULE’s radar assists in the identification and classification of a 
suspicious item, as well as its neutralization.  Users will receive real-time streaming 
video and imagery.  TSAT is the only satellite constellation that is capable of providing 
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communications on the move, therefore ensuring unified imagery across the battlefield.  
The CP will be looking at the same video feed that Soldiers on the ground, or convoy 
commanders are viewing. 
c. DOTMLPF Implications 
The utilization of TSAT and AEHF will greatly impact the SA of Soldiers 
on the battlefield.  Communications on the move and real-time imagery accessible across 
the battlefield will impact military doctrine, training, leadership, and personnel.  
Commanders will no longer be the only ones with real-time imagery and decisions will 
be made at lower and lower levels.  Doctrine will need to be re-looked and new TTPs 
developed to ensure the safety and efficiency of Soldiers.  TSAT and AEHF may actually 
increase personnel requirements, since the amount of available information will increase 
exponentially and the current allocation of analysts will be overwhelmed (Katzman, 
2006). 
d. Drawbacks 
The Pentagon’s recent postponement of the TSAT contract award until 
FY2010 means the satellite package will not be available until FY2019, thus greatly 
limiting the Army’s planned use of the FCS and future bandwidth accessibility (Shala-
Esa, 2008).  The cost of both the TSAT and the JLENS/ORBIT systems is significant. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research develops a systems engineering framework to examine how 
unmanned sensor technologies can be used to improve SA against IEDs.  The current 
satellite, UAS, UGVs, and camera systems used in theater were described, along with 
their basic physical and performance capabilities.  Future systems were also described for 
consideration in the generation of alternatives. 
A systems engineering design process is used to provide a framework with which 
to analyze this problem.  The problem definition phase resulted in the top level objectives 
of providing SA, maximizing operational suitability, and maximizing Soldier survivability 
are the top-level objectives in the effective employment of unmanned sensors in C-IED.  
Quantitative measures, defined as MOPs, are proposed for each of these qualitative 
functions. 
 Providing SA consisted of maximizing the ability to observe the battlefield, 
process the information, and understand the environment.  Achieving SA in the C-IED 
fight includes the ability to observe the battlefield using HUMINT and SIGINT.  SIGINT 
must be processed into quality and valuable information prior to being of use to a 
commander.  Achieving SA in the C-IED fight also includes the ability to monitor and 
recognize convoys, friendly, neutral and enemy forces, as well as environmental factors.  
Commanders need to be able to determine pattern recognition, and see disturbed soil 
patches.  Ideally, multiple Soldiers on the ground, commanders in TOCs, and data 
analysts would have access to the same imagery and be able to determine the attributes 
and dynamics of hostile events and forces. 
Operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed 
in field use with respect to RAM, supportability, HSI, and interoperability.  This research 
focuses on the impact of reliability and maintainability in the emplacement of unmanned 
sensor systems in the C-IED fight.  These two components were selected because they 
are important considerations from both the system and individual Soldier perspective.  
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Equipment utilized in combat must be able to perform at a high performance level for a 
sustained period of time.  When new or updated systems are introduced without sufficient 
operational testing or with an expedited time line, military maintenance capabilities are 
limited. The MOPs for operational suitability are system reliability, percentage of unit 
maintenance personnel trained to repair equipment, and percentage of repair parts 
available in unit level logistics system. 
In general, Soldier survivability consists of six key components:  reduce 
fratricide, reduce detectability of the Soldier, reduce probability of being attacked, 
minimize damage, minimize injury, and reduce physical and mental fatigue (Payan & 
Zigler, 2008).  It terms of providing SA in the C-IED fight utilizing unmanned sensors, 
the key component of maximizing Soldier survivability is reducing physical and mental 
fatigue on the Soldier.  Reducing physical and mental fatigue is measured by the 
physical, cognitive, and workload constraints placed on the Soldier by the system (Payan 
& Zigler, 2008). The MOPs for Soldier survivability are training time and physical 
workload. 
The second phase of the systems engineering process is solution design and 
consists of generation of alternatives and solution analysis.  To ensure that all the 
significant system functions, as described in the functional hierarchy and reviewed in the 
objectives hierarchy, are adequately addressed in the generation of alternatives, the 
system design elements are broken down into partitions or sectors.  Three alternatives 
were generated:  baseline, near-term, and long-term.  The base-line system consists of 
current unmanned sensors, and satellites used by the Army; the near term system includes 
systems that have completed research development tests and are being prepared for 
fielding, and the long term system combines satellite systems and unmanned sensor 
systems that may be available in the next 10–15 years.  Each alternative’s basic 
specifications, battlefield flow (highlighting each unmanned sensor’s use for observe, 
detect, and battle management), and drawbacks are addressed. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analysis conducted in this research is only a starting point for improvements 
in meeting the war-fighters’ desires in providing SA in the C-IED fight.  Although the 
methodology used in this thesis provides a framework for pairing war-fighter desires with 
current and future unmanned sensor systems, further alternatives may be generated for 
use in decision making and solution implementation.  Recommendations for future 
research in the area of improving SA in the C-IED fight through unmanned sensors 
include: 
 Performance analysis could be conducted to evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of system alternatives in providing SA in the C-IED, based 
on the needs analysis, objectives hierarchy, and associated evaluation 
metrics developed in this thesis.  The three alternatives could be evaluated 
and analyzed with reference to various operational scenarios. 
 The life-cycle cost of each proposed alternative used to perform the 
identified system functions of observe, detect, and battle management 
could be researched and estimated.  This would allow for a cost-benefit 
analysis of the different alternatives and allow the decision maker to 
understand the relationship between increased cost and  
predicted performance. 
 The conduct of a thorough risk analysis of each alternative, particularly in 
the areas of technological risk, would be very useful.  Risk analysis, and 
subsequent risk management, is a cyclic process that is executed 
continuously throughout a program’s life cycle and is an important part of 
systems analysis.  It is especially beneficial at the early stage of the system 
life cycle. 
 Modeling and simulation-based analysis of alternatives.  Each alternative 
could be modeled and simulations run to see how the proposed 
combination of sensors impacts a commander’s ability to perform each 
function of providing SA. 
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APPENDIX B. KEY MILITARY CONTRIBUTORS 
 The following Army officers provided insight to this research via classified and 
unclassified e-mail communications, survey responses, and telephone conversations. 
 LTC Del Hall:  deployed twice, once as an Infantry Battalion Commander, 
once on a Division Staff. 
 LTC Mark Walters:  deployed twice, once as a RSTA Battalion 
Commander, once as a JIEDDO Support Team Leader to MND-B HQ. 
 LTC James Salome:  deployed twice, once as a Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT) Training Officer (S3), once as a Battalion S3. 
 LTC Frederick Wintrich:  deployed twice, once as a BCT Executive 
Officer (XO), once as an Infantry Battalion XO. 
 LTC Rob Haycock:  deployed once as an Infantry Battalion Commander. 
 LTC Thomas Kunk:  deployed twice, once as an Infantry Battalion 
Commander, once as an Infantry Battalion XO. 
 LTC William Krahling:  deployed twice, once as a Brigade Support 
Battalion (BSB) Commander, once as a BSB XO. 
 LTC Anthony Coston:  deployed twice, once as a Divisional Staff Planner, 
once as a BSB XO. 
 MAJ Jimmy Mills:  deployed once as a BSB S3. 
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